Internal Currency Markets and Production in the Soviet Union by Goldberg, L.S. & Karimov, I.
Internal Currency Markets and 
Production in the Soviet Union
Goldberg, L.S. and Karimov, I.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-91-025
August 1991 
Goldberg, L.S. and Karimov, I. (1991) Internal Currency Markets and Production in the Soviet Union. IIASA Working Paper. 
WP-91-025 Copyright © 1991 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3540/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper 
Internal Currency Markets and 
Product ion in the Soviet Union 
Linda S. Goldberg 
and 
II 'dar Karimov 
WP-91-25 
August 1991 
BIIIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg o Austria Telephone: +43 2236 715210 o Telex: 079 137 iiasa a o Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
Internal Currency Markets and 
Production in the Soviet Union 
Linda S. Goldberg 
and 
Il'dar Karirnov 
WP-91-25 
August 1991 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed 
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
HIIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria Telephone: +43 2236 715210 Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
Foreword 
IIASA has just completed a project sponsored, in part, by 
the USSR State Committee on Economic Reform. Among the 
considerable number of economists from different Eastern and 
Western countries involved with the project, Il'dar Karimov, co- 
author of this paper, has closely collaborated il-I research 
activities. Although his study has begun prior to his association 
with IIASA, the final version of the paper was completed at the 
Institute. 
In this study, the institutional structures wt~ich restrict 
the activities of managers in export sectors in the Soviet Union 
are formulated in a theoretical model. Given this structure, 
enterprise managers determine the division of output between 
internal sale and export, arid determine how much of their hard 
currency earnings will be supplied to auctions or interbank 
currency markets. The effects of a range of government policy 
tools, such a s  official exchange rates, hard currency 
appropriation rates, market structure, and pi-ofjt tax rates on 
the volume and destination of producer output and use of hard 
currency revenues are emphasized. The study facilitates an 
identification and evaluation of key determinants of internal 
currency trade and singles out cornerstones in ttte evolution of 
the dual exchange rate system that was in place in the USSR in 
1990 and 1991. 
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Project Leader 
Economic Transition and 
Integration Project 
Internal Currencv Markets and Production in the Soviet Union 
January 1991 
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Changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic policies may yield surprising results when 
applied within an economy in the process of economic reform. This paper examines the 
effectiveness of policy instruments introduced as components of partial economic-reform 
programs, as in the Soviet Union. It is shown that the market power of producers in domestic 
industries and the design of currency auctions or interbank markets are key determinants, 
respectively, of the magnitude and direction of the enterprise responses to policy changes and 
external shocks. Policy-induced shifts in production and the hard currency allocation decisions 
of producers are determined. These optimizing choices have implications for: the supply of 
goods available for domestic consumption; domestic goods prices; the supply of hard currency to 
internal auctions or interbank markets; the free internal price of foreign exchange; export 
volumes; and the overall trade balance. 
This research was initiated during the joint U.S. and USSR National Academies of Science program on 
"Restructuring the Soviet Economy" (Boston, 1990 and Moscow, 1991). The authors are grateful for comments 
by Bill Ethier, Barry Ickes, anonymous referees and especially those of Randi Ryterman. Participants in seminars 
at the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, Rochester, University of Colorado at Boulder, and the Federal Reserve 
Board also provided useful insights. Goldberg is grateful for the technical support provided by The C.V.Starr 
Center at New York University. Karimov is grateful for the technical support provided by the Economic Reform 
and Integration Project at International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
I. Introduction 
It  is tempting to recommend that policy instruments used in the developed economies of the 
West be applied to the reforming economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This paper 
considers whether conventional policy instruments have conventional effects in an economy 
undergoing economic reform. Drawing on the particular institutional features in the Soviet 
Union, we formalize the constraints on the activities of managers in exportables sectors of a 
reforming economy. Due to the distortions introduced by institutional constraints and due to the 
degree of competition in various markets, it is shown that economists must proceed cautiously 
when accepting the conventional wisdom on the possible output and foreign-exchange-market 
responses of enterprises to policy changes. Specifically, the choice of exchange rate regime and 
the design of internal currency markets may enable large enterprises to exert considerable 
monopoly power on the supply side of internal currency markets. Consequently, production 
responses to policy changes may be precisely the opposite of those generally predicted. 
Furthermore, the attainment of currency convertibility and the ability of a government to attract 
hard currency supplies to auctions or interbank markets critically depends on both the system of 
taxation and the structure of surrender requirements and compensation for appropriated foreign 
currency earnings. 
Although the model of this paper and the conclusions are discussed in the context of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the key points raised in the text are of broader applicability. 
Any country which adopts an exchange-rate regime which includes currency auctions or 
interbank currency markets should recognize that the market design could impart monopoly 
power to enterprises and lead to policy outcomes counter to those predicted by conventional 
wisdom. 
To develop these points, the choices faced by enterprise managers operating under a 
stylized dual exchange rate regime in a planned economy which has undergone partial economic 
reform are modelled. The optimal response of production and currency allocation choices of 
mangers to a range of policy changes are derived, where the changes include alterations in the 
system of compensation for exports, in turnover taxes, in official production quotas, and in 
external influences, as measured by changes in world market prices for export goods. The 
implications of these measures are traced for the levels and destination markets of output, 
domestic goods prices, shortages, external trade balances, the supply side of freely functioning 
internal currency auctions or interbank markets and for the internal "flexible" exchange rate. 
Moreover, the results can be used to address a frequent concern of officials in economies 
undergoing economic reform that the reduced regulation of foreign exchange flows will trigger a 
reallocation of a substantial portion of domestic production toward export markets, thereby 
exacerbating or creating domestic shortages. The grounds for these concerns depend on the stage 
of economic reform that has been achieved. While the competitive structure of markets for 
foreign exchange can determine the direction of producer response, the extent of reforms of tax 
codes and in demonopolizing goods markets determine the magnitude of firm-level output 
versus price responses to policy changes. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 details some of the 
relevant features of the Soviet economy. Section 3 solves the static optimization problem of the 
managers in the economy's exportables sectors. Section 4 provides comparative statics results 
and determines the effects on production allocation and hard currency supplies to internal 
currency markets of changes in: the enterprise tax; turnover tax rates; official exchange rates; 
world market prices for exportables; government hard currency appropriation shares; and 
production quotas. The sensitivity of the results to the market power of producers in their 
respective industries and the structure of demand and supply to regional internal currency 
markets are stressed as important determinants of producer responses. Section 5 concludes. 
11. Features of the Soviet Economv 
Certain institutional features of the Soviet Economy motivate this joint analysis of goods 
markets and currency markets. Of particular interest are the stipulation of exchange regime 
operations, the structure of compensation for exports, and the separation in the accounting of 
foreign currency and rouble transaction related flows. Many of these features also are common 
to other countries in Eastern Europe. 
In 1991 the structure of "differentiated-exchange-coefficients" formerly operational in 
the USSR was replaced by a more unified controlled-exchange-rate regime. The differentiated- 
exchange-coefficients previously applied to traded goods were an analog of multiple exchange 
rates and include several thousand coefficients broken down by different regions, currencies and 
commodities. The movement away from multiple exchange rates was the message of the 
October 1990 decree by President Mikhail Gorbachev. In the aggregate economy, a new 
commercial exchange rate replaced the complex system of foreign currency coefficients: while 
some transactions are conducted at the old official rate (for example, repayment of official 
foreign currency debts), others are conducted at a "personal exchange rate" (tourism, for 
instance), and still others conducted at a flexible "market rateU.l For an enterprise, the existence 
of a fixed official exchange rate and a "market" rate determined on currency auctions or in 
interbank exchanges suggests an analogy with the types of dual-exchange-rate systems that have 
been observed in many developing countries, including Latin America. However, especially 
within economies in transition from a centrally planned to a market system, the design of these 
auctions or currency exchanges can significantly affect the magnitude of certain distortions on 
enterprise behavior. 
A distinct literature examines the effectiveness of policy changes under dual exchange 
rates, albeit in much different contexts. That body of literature, typified by the models of 
l ~ s  of June 1991, four types of (legal) arrangements existed in the USSR for trade in foreign currencies. These include 
currency auctions, bilateral operations between enterprises, interbank transactions, and foreign currency exchange 
through the Gosbank (the Central Bank of the USSR). 
Dornbusch et al. (1983), Obstfeld (1986), and Lizondo (1987), emphasize the importance of 
portfolio allocation (currency-demand side) decisions for determining internal exchange rates. 
In important contrast to that literature, our specification takes the currency demand side as given 
and emphasizes a specific producer- based channel through which policy changes affect hard 
currency supplies to internal currency auctions or interbank markets. Our approach provides 
particularly clear insights valid for reforming economies, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European economies, especially those which have not yet succeeded at accomplishing extensive 
banking and capital-market reforms. 
The production scenario described in this paper is applicable to enterprises producing 
exportable goods. For the Soviet Union, the key export sectors are fuels, non-food raw 
materials, and machinery and equipment. In 1989 Soviet fuel exports accounted for over one 
third of Soviet export revenues from non-socialist countries. Non-food raw materials exports 
accounted for an additional one quarter of export earnings. Taken together, over sixty percent of 
Soviet hard-currency revenues from the nonsocialist- developed West and developing countries 
are associated with fuel and non-fuel raw materials.2 
Traditionally, almost all hard currency revenues generated by the export sales of 
enterprises have been appropriated by the central government. The act of appropriating export 
earnings is not unique to the Soviet Union. Many countries have had rigid foreign-exchange- 
surrender requirements3 However, the Soviet and, to some extent, the Eastern European 
systems have differed from these other countries in a fundamental feature. While all exporters 
receive the domestic-currency value of hard-currency revenues converted at a government 
determined rate, in the Soviet Union producers have been compensated for their exports at 
centrally determined rouble prices that were often unrelated to the world market prices. 
2The Soviet foreign trade performance during the second half of the 1980s is detailed in PlanEcon Report no.20-21 
vol.VI May 25, 1990. These statistics may be misleading since many of the transactions included in the aggregates may 
not be competitively priced and took place in the form of bilateral barter and trade credit arrangements. 
3Surrender requirements are broadly applied in Eastern European economies. Quirk et al. (1987) details the surrender 
requirements of a range of countries outside of Eastern Europe, including Bolivia, Gambia, Ghana, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
the Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uruguay and Zambia. 
Enterprise reforms proposed or enacted since 1987 were intended to alter this mechanism 
by which enterprises are compensated for their export sales. Specifically, while the government 
still appropriates a significant share of enterprise foreign-currency earnings, the earnings are 
valued in relation to world-market prices and some residual hard currency is captured directly by 
enterprises. The managers of these enterprises can determine, subject to certain institutional 
constraints, how the foreign currency will be utilized. This decision by the managers amounts 
to a choice between selling the hard currency in "free" internal markets, such as currency 
auctions or interbank markets, or retaining the hard currency for discretionary foreign currency 
expenditures. In such "free" internal markets, the procedure for selling foreign currency 
earnings may be heavily regulated. Indeed, the government remains involved in foreign 
currency auctions and interbank markets, and may limit participants to a certain class of agents 
on both the supply side and the demand side. Instead of entering these markets, if the manager 
opts to hold foreign currency receipts in the form of retained earnings, these receipts can be held 
either as cash or  in foreign currency accounts. The managers use these resources to provide 
goods and benefits to workers, or to purchase imports that are only available when the 
transactions are conducted in hard currencies. 
In sum, our simplified representation of the Soviet economy focuses on the export sectors 
which produce enough output to fulfill "state orders" (government-production quotas known as 
goszakazy), and then produce additional output for sale on external and internal goods markets. 
The net receipts of hard currency by these producers are determined by their export sales, 
adjusted for the share of hard-currency earnings retained by the government and by the 
producers' expenditures on hard-currency imported inputs into the production process. The 
optimizing activity of these producers yields a supply-side driven model of goods and hard 
currency made available to internal markets. As previously noted, the structure of internal goods 
markets and internal currency markets are key determinants of the expected effects of policy 
changes within the institutional structure of the Soviet Union. This is especially important for 
predicting the impact of policy changes on production flows, internal currency auctions and 
internal "free" exchange rates, and the balance of trade. 
The model embeds a number of premises about the extent of reforms in place in the 
Soviet Union. First, i t  is assumed that some price reforms have already been accomplished so 
that the home-currency prices of raw materials are closer to world levels than in the pre-reform 
period. This enables us to abstract from determining which industries will emerge with 
comparative advantages in export production. 
Second, some reforms of enterprise activities are in place, including the imposition of 
"hard budget constraints": enterprises must generate revenues from output sales to cover their 
expenditures. However, banking reforms are not yet completed suggesting that the borrowing 
and lending activities of firms are rationed. Free capital markets are not yet in existence and the 
export and import of capital is extremely limited.4 
Third, free unimpeded trade in hard currencies is permitted with the Soviet Union, but 
enterprises are prohibited from making direct hard-currency transfers to employees in the form 
of salaries. This distortion has two effects: i) hard-currency- allocation decisions remain the 
domain of enterprise managers; and ii) payments-in-kind rather than direct distributions are 
provided to workers if the enterprise chooses to retain hard currency rather that selling in 
internal-currency markets. 
4~hus, interest rates are not fundamental determinants of firm or consumer level activities. Nonetheless, the problem 
of distributing profits across consumption and investment could be appended to our model without modifying any of 
our results. The only access to capital markets is for the financing of expenditures incurred within a single fiscal year. 
It is difficult to obtain credits for financing longer term projects and standard repayment terms do not exist for those 
credits which currently are granted. Although the static framework invoked is consistent with the lack of complete 
perfect capital markets observed in the current Soviet system, parameters in our model can be used to reflect 
intertemporal valuations. 
111. Producer Behavior 
The producer behavior applies to those industries that produce both for internal consumption and 
for export to foreign markets.5 Managers in this sector choose, subject to certain constraints: 1) 
levels of production for export sales6; 2) levels of production for sale in internal goods markets; 
and 3) the allocation of hard currency receipts across retained earnings and for sale to internal 
currency markets. The total production of a firm producing exportables, Y, is divided into three 
parts: Y is the government or quota portion of output; Y, is the portion of output sold in the free 
internal home market; and Y, is the portion of output sold as exports on the free external 
market.7 The revenues from production are described a s  either primary rouble revenues, 
secondary rouble revenues or hard currency revenues. This distinction is important: regulations 
on separate accounting of rouble and hard currency flows make these flows nonfungible and 
introduce arbitrage opportunities. 
Primarv Rouble Revenues: The primary rouble revenues of the producer are the sum of three 
components, each of which is related to the destination market of output. Quota production Y is 
sold at the government-controlled-wholesale price, p.8 Output quantity Y, is sold in internal 
markets at p, , the free internal wholesale price of the product. The firm is paid in roubles for 
quota production and for the goods sold in internal markets. 
Although the firm realizes p, as unit revenues on goods sold in internal markets, a wedge 
between consumer and producer prices is created by the existence of consumer turnover taxes, 
represented by q. The internal market demand for exportables is represented by the residual 
5Clearly, each export sector is distinguishable in terms of the structure (and parameterization) of market demands, 
production expenditures, and specific policy measures applied by the central government. However, firms within a 
sector can be viewed as identical. 
6 ~ s  modelled below, these export earnings must yield sufficient foreign currency revenues to cover the expenditures by 
the enterprise on its imported inputs into production. 
7During the late 1980s, the percentage share of total production distributed by the central government was quite high in 
the raw materials sector. While this share varies across regions and types of materials, for oil it remains almost 
everywhere more than 95 percent; for brown coal 70 percent, and for coke 95 percent and higher. The quota share of 
production is lower for other exportables. 
8This price does not include the turnover tax accumulated by the central government in its resale of raw materials to 
other firms or individuals. 
inverse demand function p,=p,(Y, ,q).9 The shape of this demand curve is denoted by its slope 
p,'. The general case of p,' < 0 describes a market where producers have some market power in 
influencing the sale price in internal markets. The larger is p,', the more monopolistic the 
industry. 
Production for sale to external markets, Y,, is transacted at world market prices. It is 
assumed that the producer is small in world markets so that p*, the foreign-currency price of the 
export good, is exogenous to the firm.1° Due to the institutional constraint that foreign currency 
must flow through official channels, the producer does not receive all of the hard currency 
generated by its export sales. Instead, it receives some government-determined share of its hard- 
currency earnings and compensation in roubles, at the official exchange rate, for the hard- 
currency earnings retained by the government. Define w as the share of hard currency revenues 
retained by the producer, and (1-w) as the share of hard currency revenues appropriated by the 
central government. The producers are compensated in roubles for this appropriation, where the 
compensation rate is the official exchange rate, e, in domestic currency per unit of foreign 
exchange." 
Taken together, this compensation structure yields "primary rouble revenues" from: i) 
fixed revenues pY from quota sales; ii) revenues p,(Y, ,q)Y, from free trade in internal markets; 
and iii) rouble compensation for the portion of the total hard-currency export revenues seized by 
the government. This compensation is 
P* Y, (I-W) e (1) 
Summing, total primarv rouble revenues to the enterprise are: 
9The residual demand function is assumed to be smooth enough (continuously differentiable) to guarantee uniqueness 
of this representation. The specification of the turnover tax is general enough to capture any type of shock to internal 
demand for raw materials. 
l@I%e assumption that the Soviet Union is a price taker in world markets is reasonable for most export goods, and for 
raw materials such as oil, natural gas, coal and metals. It is less reasonable in the context of trade in diamonds and 
chromium, or for some trade with the smaller Eastern European economies. 
llPreviously, the hard currency retention rate also could vary according to production levels within an industry and 
across industries. The exchange rate system was also complex, with different exchange rates used for taxation and 
compensation purposes. Recent announcements have declared intended movements toward a single or effective 
exchange rate which would apply to all transactions between the central government and businesses. 
The total gross hard currency receipts of the firm are given by: 
R* = p * w ~ x  
Of these hard currency receipts by the firm, secondary rouble revenues are generated only when 
some portion of the R* is sold in internal currency markets in exchange for roubles. 
Production Costs: In order to produce total output level Y (Y = Y + Y, + YJ, managers 
undertake replacement "primary expenditures" in terms of both rouble goods and imported hard 
currency goods. These expenditure functions are, respectively, E(Y) and E*(Y), and are 
assumed to be separable, continuous and differentiable.12 Domestic currency expenses must be 
paid out of primary and secondary rouble earnings: foreign currency expenses must be paid out 
of the remaining hard currency export earnings. Expenditure functions are assumed to reflect all 
necessary production costs, including: normal wages and salaries, depreciation charges in 
roubles and in hard currency, rental payments, and employee taxes.13 
The shape of the expenditure functions depends upon the industry under discussion. 
Throughout, it is assumed that marginal costs are positive, Et(Y)>O and E*'(Y)>o. In regions of 
diminishing returns, as generally characterizes the depletable resource sectors (fuels and non- 
food raw materials) and technologies with capacity constraints, the expenditure function will be 
convex to the origin, E"(Y)>O and E*"(Y)>o. 
Co-evaluation of Rouble and Hard Currency Flows : Under the dual-exchange-rate regime, 
different exchange rates are used for valuation of different foreign-currency transactions. An 
12.4n alternative specification could introduce domestic and foreign inputs as complementary rather than separable. 
This would not fundamentally change the results. The continuity assumption implicitly treats enterprises as able to 
expand production activities without facing rigid constraints imposed by the scarcity of inputs into the production 
process. 
131"hese expenditure functions are the only mechanism in our model through which technological progress, input 
productivity shifts, or alterations in input mixtures can influence the equilibrium outcomes. While investment and 
intertemporal growth decisions are not explicitly modelled, the State can impose some minimal level of desired growth 
through Y requirements. 
official fixed-exchange rate is used when the government calculates the rouble value of 
appropriated export earnings. An official fixed rate also is applied when the government 
computes taxes on the foreign-currency earnings retained by the enterprise. The exchange rate 
used for valuing other foreign-currency-related flows depends on the particular flow. 
The hard currency earned by firms, R*, is divided between three uses: 
i) R,* is the amount of  foreign currency retained by the enterprise. This amount is required 
to be at least as great as the firm's expenditures on imported inputs into production. These 
hard-currency revenues (re-calculated at the official exchange rate e for taxation purposes) 
are included in the firm's taxable income. The after-tax revenues net of E*(Y) can be applied 
toward the purchase of foreign-currency valued investment or consumption goods or used to 
secure benefits for employees.14 
ii) R,* is the amount of foreign currency sold by the firm in internal foreign-currency 
markets. The rouble receipts from these hard-currency sales are referred to as secondarv 
rouble revenues. These roubles can be combined with primary rouble revenues to cover 
domestic currency expenditures on goods or capital and domestic currency taxes or to pay 
workers salaries.15 
iii) E*(Y) is the enterprise's expenditure on imported inputs into production. 
Therefore, 
R* = R,* + R,* ; 
R,* 22 E'(Y); 
14For example, the managers can send workers abroad for professional education and training. While opportunities for 
consumption good expenditures are limited, opportunities of this second type are sufficiently large to absorb any 
additional revenues. 
1 5 ~ h e  theoretical framework is general enough to encompass the possibility of R2*<0. Under negative R2*, the 
enterprise buys rather than sells foreign exchange in these markets. However, due to the institutional constraints on 
specific classes of firms, we emphasize in the text the activities of net exporters or hard currency suppliers, rather the 
activities of net importers. All comparative statics results are signed for the net exporter case. 
The value to the enterprise of holding retained-earnings in excess of foreign-currency 
costs [R,* > E*(Y)] is denoted by the exchange rate e1.l6 The value to the enterprise of selling 
hard currency R,* in auctions or internal currency markets is the price offered in internal 
markets for currency, e,. This flexible-exchange-rate on internal-market sales, e,, is assumed to 
be higher (more depreciated) than the official fixed-conversion rate, e. 
Although the official exchange rate e is exogenous to the firm, the enterprise recognizes 
that it may have some market power in influencing prices in internal markets for hard currencies. 
The manager can determine the extent to which the foreign currency supplied by his enterprise 
to the auction or interbank market can move the internal price of foreign exchange. The price of 
foreign exchange in "free" internal currency markets (ej declines as the supply of hard currency 
made available internally increases. This inverse relationship between the market exchange rate 
and the hard currency supplied by managers, R,*, is expressed as: 
e: = e: ( ~ 2 ' )  (6) 
where e,'(R,*) < 0 represents the slope of the residual currency demand curve relevant to the 
firm, thereby subsuming the demand side of the internal foreign exchange markets which is 
exogenously given to the enterprise manager. e2'(R2*) can be interpreted as the ability of this 
enterprise to influence the exchange rate in the internal currency markets. In most developed 
countries, it is expected that e2'(R2*) is close to zero. In that case, the activities of any single 
enterprise would not have a large effect on the exchange rate.17 
However, e2'(R2*) could be large (in absolute terms) and significant in countries in 
which the government tightly regulates the participation in foreign exchange auctions. Indeed, 
early currency auctions in the Soviet Union were characterized by relatively few participants on 
the supply side, suggesting that each large participant had more than a marginal ability to 
'%roughout, E*(Y) is the minimum amount of hard currency which must be earned by the firm to support production 
level Y. At the very least, the firm holds retained earning to cover E*(Y). .If optimal, the firm can choose to retain 
greater amounts of its hard currency earning than the minimum holding defined by E*(Y). 
17~lternatively, e : ' ( ~ ~ * )  close to zero can depict currency auctions run with government intervention in order to strictly 
control the supply of currency to internal markets. 
influence internal auction prices.18 This is supported by the evidence on currency auctions 
provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Selected Currency Auctions in the USSR 
Date Location Volume # suppliers # buyers official rate auction rate 
(mln$ equiv.) (SUR/vS$) (SUR/vS$) 
11/03/89 Moscow, V. 14.0 3 1 210 0.60 8.38 
05/11/90 Vilnius, V. 0.098 1 8 0.60 14.70 
07/19/90 Moscow, V. 15.0 27 88 0.59 22.70 
12/10/90 Tallin, BE. .371/ .212* 19 57 1.66 25.28 * * 
02/05/91 Kemerovo, K. 2.0 7 8 1.65 27.00 
02/13/91 Moscow, V. 21.04 6 1 156 1.63 29.40 
03/14/91 Moscow, V. 6.10 50 26 1.65 35.36 
Source: Authors compilation from various issues of Commersant, USSR publication. 
V= Vnesheconombank (bank for foreign economic affairs in USSR): this bank does not transact in "fast dollars".; 
BE= Bank of Estonia: all banks located in Estonia have the right to transact in "fast dollars". These dollars are 
independent of the Vnesheconombank and associated constraints on time of transference of dollars.; K = 
Kouzbassotsbank: not permitted to transact in "fast dollars". 
"Fast dollars" have a delivery period of three to four days. Slow dollars normally are deliverd in two months. A 
pennium is paid for fast dollars. 
* slow dollars (S.3715 mln) + fast dollars (S.212 mln) = total transacted (S.583 mln) 
** weighted average of the exchange rate on "slow dollars" and "fast dollars" 
180ur discussion of the auctions or interbank foriegn currency markets basically assumes a separation of markets for 
foreign exchange transactions along the lines of the October 1990 decree of Gorbachev. However, if internal currency 
markets were designed to integrate different types of flows, so that small enterprise activities, clandestine black markets 
and officially tolerated parallel markets are absorbed, the market power of an individual enterprise would decline. For 
example, this could occur if the official "free" markets absorbed the activities of: the export smugglers who remit hard 
currency earnings through the black market; the import smugglers who purchase hard currency in order to make 
payments; and tourists who sell hard currency internally to black rnarketeers. 
The data in Table 1 show that the number of participants in auctions were limited. For 
example, on 7/19/90 there were 27 suppliers of currency to the auction and 88 demanders of 
currency. Nonetheless, these data do not provide a concrete enough image o f  the concentration 
of market power among these few participants. Such market power is illustrated at an auction on 
12/14/90 in Moscow when a total of $14.4 million was traded. Of this amount, $5.52 million 
(38 percent of the total) was presented to the auction by a single supplier. 
Further proof of the existence of market power in internal markets is drawn from an 
examination of recent interbank operations in foreign currency conducted at the Moscow 
Currency Exchange (MCE). Forty-five licences which permit banks to engage in interbank 
foreign currency trade have been issued. Of these, only twelve licenses are in use. Even among 
these twelve banks, the market is thinned further by limitations on minimum transactions size 
(at $10,000). 
In sum, high values of %'(R,*) can arise under either highly inelastic currency demand 
(which is unlikely in these economies during the reform process) or, more likely, when an 
enterprise has power to affect significantly the volume of total flow supplies of hard currency to 
internal currency markets. 
The Objective Function of the Firm's Manager : When both rouble and hard currency revenues 
are included in the same balance sheet, the taxable income of the enterprise is the sum of 
primary rouble revenues from sales, secondary rouble revenues from the auction or interbank 
currency-market sales of R,*, the official valuation of revenues retained by the firm minus it's 
expenditure on foreign-currency inputs into production, e(R,*- E*(Y)). 
Defining T as the fixed profit-tax rate, the net after-tax profit in exportables has two 
components: 
i )  the rouble part: (I-T)(R + R,* e, - E(Y) ) - T~(R,*  - E*(Y)) 2 0 (7) 
where the first term is the after tax value of all rouble valued flows and the latter term represents 
rouble taxes paid on the government's valuation of the enterprise's retained earnings. The second 
component of net profits is: 
ii) the hard currency pan: R,* - E*(Y) a 0 
where this second flow is the foreign currency retained by the firm after it has determined how 
much of its hard currency earnings to sell in auction or interbank currency markets. It is 
assumed that the profit function maximized by enterprise managers introduces these flows 
according to their rouble valuations. 
Table 2: Variables Defined in the Model 
e official exchange rate (roubles1 foreign currency) 
e,(R,*) free internal market exchange rate (roubleslforeign currency) 
el value to the firm of retained earnings in excess of necessary expenditure on 
imported inputs into production (roubleslforeign currency) 
4 investment or consumption value premium if positive; transactions cost and risk 
premium on purchases in the secondary goods market if negative. 
Y production for state order (gosmkazy) 
Y, production for sale in free internal markets 
Y, production for export sale 
Y total production, Y+Yh+Yx 
p , unit price on production for state order 
Ph unit price on production for sale in internal markets 
P * world market price of export good (in foreign currency) 
9 turnover tax (sales t ~ ) :  per unit tax charged internal market consumers of good 
w share of hard currency revenues from exporting available to the enterprise 
T profit tax rate 
E(Y) domestic currency expenditures1costs for production level Y 
E*(Y) foreign currency expenditurelcosts for production level Y 
R,* foreign currency earnings of firm retained for payment of E*(Y) and purchases of 
consumer goods1 foreign training, etc. for employees. 
R,* foreign currency earnings of firm sold at internal hard currency auctions or in free 
internal currency markets 
The firms's rouble valuation of net retained-hard-currency earnings differs from the 
valuation applied by the government for taxation purposes. The firm's conversion rate for 
valuation of retained earnings, e, , is determined by the investment or consumption value of 
having readily-available foreign exchange. The wedge between the auction price and the 
secondary value (or opportunity cost) is defined as 4, so that el = e, + 4. 4 is a firm-specific 
function which represents the premium on hard currency. 
4's value depends, in part, on the design of internal markets. One can consider two 
distinct cases. The first case, 4 < 0, arises if there are high premiums demanded by money 
dealers for operating in secondary markets or if there are high transactions costs associated with 
getting goods from abroad without using official channels. 
The second case, 4 > 0, can arise because a firm may not be able to easily obtain foreign 
currency in the future when additional foreign currency investment opportunities arise.19 As  will 
be shown below, under these circumstances the enterprise will retain all hard currency earnings 
and avoid participation in the auctions or interbank markets. 
In general, if internal currency markets are sufficiently open to permit spontaneous and 
unfettered transactions, e, will be close to el (4 will be small). At present, some currency 
auctions in the Soviet Union allow enterprises access to hard currency, but the foreign currency 
is not transferred to the enterprises until some later date. At the Vnesheconombank auctions and 
at the MCE the time of transfer of currency from buyers to sellers is approximately two months. 
At the Tallin auctions, the time of transfers are approximately 4 days. Under this type of 
structure, the enterprises permitted to participate in these auctions would place a higher premium 
on retaining foreign exchange than would the enterprises participating in the Tallin auctions. In 
all locations, institutionally imposed constraints on the volumes of purchase of hard currency by 
enterprises also increases the firm's valuation of 4. 
The manager's objective is to maximize the value of combined net rouble and foreign 
currency after-tax earnings: 
191t is possible to model 4 as a decreasing but positive function of R ~ * .  The marginal value of the foreign currency 
premium associated with holding additional retained earning could decline as the stock increases. This interpretation 
is most suitable for the case of 4 >0, but is not as reasonable for the more interesting case of 4 <0. 
maximize L= (1-T)[ pY + ph(Yh,q) Yh + p*e( l -w)~ ,  + R2* e2 (RZ*) - E(Y)] 
Y,,Y,,R?* + (e2(R2*) + 4)[R1* - E*(Y)] - T~(R,*  - E*(Y)) (9) 
subject to 
(I-T)[pY + ph(Yh,q).Yh + p*e (1-w) Y, + R2 * e2 @?*I - E(Y)I ( 10) 
-Te[ R,* - E * ( Y ) ] ~  0 
R,* - E*(Y) 2 0 
* * 
(11) 
where R, = p WY,-R,* . 
Equation (9) is the domestic-currency valuat io~ of the after-tax profits of the enterprise. 
Equation (10) states that the firm must generate enough primary- and secondary-rouble revenues 
to cover rouble expenses, including taxes paid in roubles on retained hard-currency earnings. 
Equation (11) states that retained foreign-currency earnings must be at least as large as 
expenditures on imported inputs into production. 
This structure has a number of interesting features. The first of these is a tax-haven 
effect. The hard-currency revenues earned by the firm are taxed at the official exchange rate 
times the marginal tax rate if they are kept as retained earnings whereas they are taxed at the 
auction rate times the marginal tax rate if they are sold in auction or interbank markets for 
foreign exchange. This increases the desirability of retained earnings relative to selling hard 
currency at auctions. Another interesting feature is that the choice of allocation of foreign 
currency earnings might have a knife-edge property whereby all foreign currency earnings (in 
excess of E*(Y)) are sold at auctions or, alternatively, all are held as retained earnings. 
The Hard Currencv Allocation Choice: The value of R,* to the manager is (I-T)~,(R,*) 
whereas the value of R,* is e2(R,*)+4 -Te. In general, the hard currency allocation choice has a 
knife-edge property.20 If (I-T)~,(R,*) > e2(R2*)+4(R,*)-~e, all hard currency earnings in 
have a full-information set-up in which the interior sulution to the hard currency allocation choice is an unstable 
equilibrium. This equilibrium is only possible if this enterprise has a large enough effect on e2(R2*) when it varies R,*. 
It then can eliminate the inequality between the returns on the alternative forms of hard currency allocations. However, 
this choice minimizes rather than maximizes the criterion function. We need not examine the trasition to the 
boundaries in this problem since the portfolio adjustment occurs instantaneously. This interpretation is consistent with 
the methodology of dynamic models of the Dornbusch (1976) "overshooting" class. 
excess of E*(Y) will be sold in internal currency markets and none would be retained by the 
firm. If the inequality is reversed, the enterprise will retain all of its excess hard currency and 
refuse to supply hard currency to internal currency markets. 
Figure 1 illustrates the hard currency allocation choice made by the enterprises along the 
range of values for 4. 
e 
where 4 = argmax [ L(R,*= E*(Y)) or YR,*=P*~YJ  ] 
Figure 1 
If 4>O, all foreign-exchange earnings will take the form of R,*, with nothing supplied 
by the enterprise to the foreign-currency auctions. If many exporters pursue similar behavior, 
the auction of foreign-currency export receipts will be characterized by little voluntary activity 
on the supply-side. As a result, if funds are to be supplied to auctions, they will have to be drawn 
from the coffers of the central bank. 
On the upper and lower vertical axes are allocations of R,* and R,*, respectively. On the 
horizontal axis are values of 4, positive and increasing to the right and negative and decreasing 
to the left. At values of 4 greater than ;ball hard currency is kept as retained earnings. At values 
of  4 below $, retained earnings are at the minimum required level, equal to E*(Y), while any 
residual hard currency receipts are sold in internal currency markets. 
This is precisely the phenomenon observed in the hard-currency auctions conducted in 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  and in Bulgaria during the same period. The 
currency auctions conducted were extraordinarily thin on the supply-side. The high consumption 
and investment value attributed by enterprises to the retention of scarce hard currency and the 
lack of internal-currency convertibility of the home currency21 led enterprises to prefer to hold 
onto any excess hard currency under their control. Hard-currency earnings were used to 
purchase scarce imported investment resources and for expenditures on hard-currency perks for 
employees such as those made evident by the dramatic increase in the numbers of workers sent 
abroad for training programs. In terms of the model, these early currency auctions were 
designed so that the wedge represented by 4 was large and positive.22 
By contrast, the case where 4 < 0 can arise when currency auctions or interbank markets 
defined broadly enough to yield an economic penalty for holding retained earnings. Initially, 
one might think that such a penalty would shift all excess earnings away from retained earnings 
and toward sales in the auction or interbank currency markets. However, closer inspection 
reveals that the distortions of the tax system create the potential for the opposite result. 
I f + > O :  * * all R1* (R,*=o, Rl =p wY,) (13a) 
c, 
If 4 <O : 0 < 4 all R2* ( R,*=E*(Y), R ~ * = ~ * W Y ,  - E*(Y)) 
r' 
(13b) 
4 > 0 all Rl* (R,*=o , R,*=~*WY, ) ( 1 3 ~ )  
Under the condition defined by (13c), the tax haven benefit from holding retained earnings 
dominates the penalty. Producers still would not participate on the supply-side of auction or 
2 1 ~ y  lack of internal convertibility we are referring to the scarcity of goods available for purchase with the soft home 
currency. 
2 2 ~ o m e  hard currency was sold to internal currency markets by those enterprises which were confronted by the 
constraint given by equation (10). 
interbank currency exchanges. This arises under high tax rates or if there is a large gap between 
the official and free-market exchange rate. 
By this knife-edge property of the currency-allocation choice, incremental policy changes 
can lead to large shifts in the allocation of hard currency across usages. The margins determining 
this allocation, in addition to being functions of tax rates, the official exchange rate and the size 
of penalties for holding retained earnings, depend on the size of export revenues and necessary 
imported inputs into production. 
&timum Choicesof Enterprise Managers: The profit maximizing choices of enterprise 
managers, given the institutional features embedded in the model, are derived by replacing R,* 
by R,* = wp*yX - R2* and differentiating the objective function with respect to R2*, Y, and Y,. 
The resulting system of. first-order conditions (provided in the Appendix) and the associated 
Hessian matrix yield solutions for Y, and Y, which clearly are interior maxima. For these 
variables, the second-order sufficient conditions for an interior maxima23 are always satisfied in 
a region of diminishing returns and are always satisfied under linear demand specifications 
(e211=pbt1 =O).
However, as emphasized in our discussion of the knife-edge properties of the currency 
allocation choice, interior solutions for the R,* chosen by an enterprise are expected only under 
restrictive conditions. In general, the Hessian matrix shows that the R,* resulting from the full 
system of first-order conditions will locally minimize rather than maximize the profits of the 
enterprise (i.e., the solution for an enterprise that is a net exporter has saddle properties: it is 
maximized in Y, and Y,, but minimized in R,*). Therefore, for a net exporter, the general 
* 
solution is that R,* will be set at one of the two margins. Either R2*=wp Y, -E*(Y) and 
* * * * * R, =E (Y), or- R, =O and R, =wp Y, -E*(Y). In the former case there will be no retained 
hard currency in excess of that needed for payment of necessary imported inputs into production. 
2 3 ~  maximization of the objective function is achieved if the Hessian matrix is negative definite. 
20 
In the latter case, all foreign-currency revenues in excess of necessary expenditures are held as 
retained earnings and not offered for sale in interbank markets or currency auctions. 
IV. Policv Effectiveness 
The sensitivity of the optimal production levels and hard-currency supplies to changes in 
exogenous policy variables and world-market prices is signed by differentiating the first-order 
conditions and conducting comparative statics exercises. When the hard-currency allocation 
choices occur at the margins, the relevant comparative statics matrices take the form: 
where [u] = [ Be, Bp*, Bw, 6Y, 6q] and the A and B matrices depend on the choice of margin. 
Below, the comparative statics results are provided for the two equilibrium solutions.24 
IV. 1 Policv Effectiveness Under Currencv Convertibilitv 
If currency convertibility is interpreted as  the voluntary conversion of foreign currency 
earnings into domestic currency, this is achieved at the margin defined by R ~ * > o . ~ '  The first- 
order conditions are given by equations (15) and (16): 
24~at r ices  A and B are derived by imposing one of the alternative margin constraints on 112* and then fully 
differentiating the first order conditions. For the case where 112*>0 and R ~ * =  E*(Y), changing the tax rate T does not 
elicit any change in the production mix. Consequently, this column is omitted from the B matrix. 
25~ecal l  that this can occur when $ <O and -$ >T(e2-e). 
Differentiation of these equations yields the matrices for comparative statics calculations, 
provided in the Appendix as matrices ACC and BCC, and derived with respect to: the official 
exchange rate, e; the world price of raw materials, p*; the share of hard-currency earnings 
retained by the government, w; the turnover tax paid by consumers, q; and the official 
production quota, Y.26 The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3. Therein, the 
signs of the comparative-statics results are distinguished for the cases of low and high e,'. 
When enterprises voluntarily supply hard currency to auction or interbank markets, 
production responses to policy changes can differ dramatically from the responses predicted by 
conventional wisdom. The underlying intuition is that if enterprises have the ability to 
significantly influence the terms of trade on their transactions, they will adjust their export and 
domestic destination production to achieve a volume of hard currency earnings and a 
corresponding terms of trade consistent with profit maximization. Consequently, the direction 
of production responses to policy changes depends critically on the size of e2', the 
competitiveness of auction and interbank markets for foreign exchange. T o  illustrate this point, 
equations (17) through (21) show the effects on production of a devaluation of the official 
exchange rate and a change in the hard-currency retention rate. These equations underlie the 
results summarized in rows two and three of Table 3, respectively. 
6Yh/6e = (det ACC)-~[ -p*(l-w)[e2~*"+ E"+ ~ ' (E*"(~*WY,-E*) + ZE*'(~*W-E*))]] (17) 
6Yx/6e = (det ACC)-~[ pf(1-w)[e2E*"+ El'+ e ~ ( ~ * " ( p * w ~ , - E * )  - 2 ( ~ * ' ) ~ ) - 2 p ~ ' ]  ] (18) 
6Yh/6w = (det ACC)-~[ [e2E*"+ E"+ ~ ' ( E * " ( ~ * W Y ~ - E * )  + ZE*'(~*W-E*))] 
D ( - ~ * )  [ (e2-e) + e2' ( 3 p * w ~ x - ~ * ) ]  
+ 2 e 2 ' p * w ~ x ~ * ' ( p * w - ~ * ' )  ] (19) 
6Yx/6w= (det Acc)-l p*[ [e2~*"+~"+e2'(~*"(P*~~X-~*)- 2( * ' )~) ) l (e~-e)+  e; ( ~ ~ * W Y ~ - E * ) ]  
-2p;[ (e2-e) + %' ( ( p * ~ ~ x - ~ * )  + ZY~(~*W-E* ' ) ) ]  
2 6 ~ o r  simplicity, the results are provided under the assumption that both internal goods' demand and internal currency 
demands are normal, differentiable, and linear. 
det Acc = [~,E*"+E"+~,'E*"(~*WY~-E*) - 2e2' (p*w-E*)2]- [-2p,'- 2e2' ( P * ~ ) '  ]
Table 3: Effect of Policv Instruments on Production Volumes 
Convertible Currency Case 
F o r  Internal Sales For  E x ~ o r t  Total 
(+> small e,' large e,' small e,' large e,' small e,' large e,' 
+ = increase; - = decrease. Total production=Y+Yh+Yx 
Results assume (p'w-E*')>o. Conditions for (p*w-E*')<o available on request. 
"small" defined by the sufficient condition: -e2'< e2 /[(p*wYX-E*) 
"large" defined by the necessary condition: -e,' > e, /[(p* WY,-E*) 
1: sufficient condition when (p*w-E3')>0 
-e2'> [e(l-w) + e2w]l[w(p* WY,-E*)]. 
2: sufficient condition when (p*w-E*')>o 
* 
-e2'> [ e, - e]/[w(p*wYX-~ )]. 
3: negative when (p'w-E*')>o; positive when (p*w-E*')<o. 
Policy Effectiveness and the Design of Currencv Markets: .A devaluation of the 
official exchange rate stimulates production for export and reduces production for internal 
markets. This occurs because the devaluation increases the relative price of exportables. For the 
case of low e,' - firms, this yields a positive overall effect on production. Although an official 
exchange rate devaluation is not contractionary in terms of aggregate production, it will increase 
the scarcity of the exportable goods in internal markets. 
In important contrast, for the case of high e;?' firms, a depreciation of the official 
exchange rate increases external sales by a considerably smaller amount. This response is 
motivated by the exertion of monopolistic pricing power in sales of hard-currency earnings in 
the auction or interbank markets. By reducing net exports in comparison with the low e,' case, 
the producer achieves higher profits and a more favorable terms-of-trade on export sales. 
This force that market power in internal currency markets exerts on production activity 
also is vividly shown by the production responses of enterprises to altered hard-currency 
appropriation rates (surrender requirements) by the government. Recall that w is the share of 
hard-currency earnings which is not appropriated by the government. For the case of small e,' 
the production responses again are "normal" and in line with conventional wisdom: increasing 
the ability of the firm to retain valuable hard-currency earnings shifts production away from 
internal markets toward exports. This yields an overall expansion of production volumes. 
Significantly, reductions in official surrender requirements (increase in w) have entirely the 
opposite effect when e,' is large: there will be a contraction of exports and an expansion of 
production for internal distribution. Both of these production reallocations reduce the downward 
pressure on the terms-of-trade on exports which was accomplished by the initial increase in w. 
Clearly, the real effects of changing hard-currency surrender requirements or  the official 
exchange rate depend on the design of the internal markets for hard currency trade. 
Analogously, the real effects of shifts in p*, the world-market price of the export good, also 
depend on e,'. Increasing the world-market price of exports can lead to contractions in export 
volumes rather than expansions. 
Increasing the production order of the state (goszakazy) first increases expenditures 
denominated in both domestic and foreign currency. Regardless of the level of e,', enterprises 
respond by offsetting this in domestic markets. This contraction of production for sale to internal 
markets mitigate the increase in marginal costs of production, and optimality requires no further 
response from production for export. While the overall profits of the enterprise decline 
(assuming that state orders yield lower unit revenues than sales on the open market), the total 
production levels of the enterprise will be unaffected. 
This discussion has emphasized that the direction of production responses to policy 
changes critically depends on the ability of the producer to influence the price of foreign 
exchange. In general, when internal currency markets are competitive and firms are unable to 
significantly effect the terms-of-trade, the expected responses of the production mix to policy 
changes are fairly standard. By contrast, when e,' is high, either because currency demands are 
inelastic or  because firms have the power to significantly influence the auction or interbank 
currency price, the optimal responses of managers can differ substantially from "conventional 
wisdom". Profit-maximizing "large" producers will use their ability to influence the internal 
terms-of-trade to optimally distort their revenues from exporting. Succinctly put, the simple 
introduction of exchange rate flexibility through auction or interbank markets during economic 
reform does not guarantee that policy initiatives will have "normal" effects. For this guarantee, 
our framework shows that a necessary precondition is that the foreign exchange markets must 
achieve a sufficient degree of competitiveness. 
Policy Effectiveness and Monopolv Power in Internal Goods Markets: The 
effectiveness of policy instruments also critically depends on the extent of reforms undertaken to 
increase the competitive structure of domestic goods markets. While it was noted that q' can 
determine the direction of an enterprise's response to shocks, p,' determines the magnitude of the 
enterprise's response to shocks. 
Suppose that prices are not fixed in internal markets, so that pht<O. Under high p,' (in 
absolute value), internal prices for the good are highly sensitive to changes in its internal goods 
supply. If internal prices are allowed to vary, high p,' describes a situation of inelastic internal 
demand or monopolistic supply. This could arise under reform characterized by decontrolled 
internal goods prices without the break-up of large state monopolies. Low p,' either describes 
the situation of more regulated internal-sales prices, highly-elastic internal demand, or highly 
competitive industries. 
In general, the more competitive the goods markets, the greater will be the response of 
production volumes to policy changes, and the lesser will be the response of prices of goods sold 
in internal markets. To demonstrate this, consider the effect of p,' on the ability of a devaluation 
of the official exchange rate to influence the supply of goods to internal markets. From 
equation (17) it is straight-forward to show that as p,' rises (in absolute value), an official 
devaluation (e increase) leads to smaller Y, contractions for low e2' firms and smaller Y, 
expansions for high e,' firms. In part, the relative-price effect of the official devaluation is 
reduced when p, is very responsive, leading to a lower internal-market supply adjustment. 
Likewise, increases in p,' leads to reduced responsiveness of Y, to shifts in state orders, the 
turnover tax, foreign price shocks, and government hard-currency surrender requirements. 
Similarly, the responsiveness of export volumes to policy changes also generally declines as the 
producers' monopoly power in domestic-goods markets rises. 
The impact of policy changes on the internal price of the exportable good is inversely 
related to the change in Y,. Therefore, for any policy change the corresponding domestic-goods 
price changes are: 
6p, /6[u] = p,' 6Y, /6[u] (22) 
The price impact of policy changes depends on the competitiveness of internal goods 
markets. Changes in p,', whether caused by efforts to demonopolize existing industries or by 
opening of domestic markets to foreign competition, operate through two channels: as a direct 
multiplier of 6Yh/6[u] and as a determinant of 6Y, /6[u], since as p,' rises the responsiveness of 
output Y, to shocks declines. As p,' rises, the "inflationary" impact of a shock increases although 
less than proportionately. Conversely, as p,' falls, the "inflationary" impact of a parameter 
change declines, although the output response rises. As p,' tends toward zero, policy changes 
induce the greatest output effects and the weakest price effects. 
Effects of Policv Changes on Internal Hard Currencv Sales 
The functioning of internal currency markets and the level of the exchange rate which 
results in currency auctions and interbank markets are important to the reform program in the 
transition economy. Given the functioning of these markets, we can determine the effects of 
policy changes on the supplies of hard currency sold in internal currency markets, R2*, and the 
associated flexible exchange rate, e,. To accomplish this, we solve: 
a~,*lb[u] = 6 (wp*~ , -~* (~ ) ) /6 [u ]  (23) 
for each [u] = [p*, e, w, Y, q]. Table 4 provides a summary of the results, when the currency is 
The second row of Table 4 states that an official devaluation will increase hard currency 
sales by net exporters to auction and interbank markets.28 This appreciates the free internal 
exchange rate. By contrast, an increase in world market prices of export goods either can 
increase or decrease in hard-currency sales to internal markets. This depends on the design of 
these currency markets and the ability of the exporters to exert monopoly power therein. For 
low %' firms, enterprises will increase their sales of hard currency to auction or interbank 
markets and appreciate the internal market exchange rate when: i) the official rate is devalued; 
ii) the world market price of the export increases; iii) the government appropriation rate 
declines (w increases); and iv) turnover taxes increase. 
27These results are provided for the case when the marginal hard-currency revenue from exports exceeds marginal 
production costs @*w-E*)>o. Otherwise, the conditions for signing many of the results are complicated and 
unintuitjve. 
28~ere in ,  we are not discussing the possibility of shifting between the margins of convertible and unconvertible 
currency. 
Table 4: Policy Changes, Hard Currency Sales and the Internal Exchange Rate 
R,* internal exchange rate, e, 
small e2' large e2' small e2' large e2' 
P* increase' decrease192 appreciation' depreciation192 
e increase increase appreciation appreciation 
Y no effect no effect no effect no effect 
q increase increase appreciation appreciation 
1 : sufficient condition when ( p * w - ~ * ' ) > ~  : 
for small:-e2'c [e(l-w) + e 2 w ] l [ w ( ( p * w ~ x - ~ * ) + 2 p * ~ ~ X ]  
2: satisfied when Yx + p*(b~x/bp*) cO. 
3: sufficient condition when ( p * ~ - ~ * ' ) > ~  : 
for small: -e,'< [ e, - WY,-E*)+~~*  wYX] 
4: satisfied when Yx + w(bYx/bw) c0. 
For high e2' firms, it is more difficult to determine the effect of policy changes on these 
internal currency markets. It is clear that enterprises will increase their sales of hard currency to 
auction or interbank markets and the internal exchange rate will appreciate when: i) the official 
rate is devalued; and ii) turnover taxes are increased. The effects of other policy measures 
depend on the size of marginal revenues and marginal costs in production. 
IV.11 Policv Effectiveness Under Currencv Inconvertibilitv 
Herein, currency inconveitibility is defined as the unwillingness of firms to sell hard- 
currency earnings in exchange for roubles at given market conditions. At this margin solution of 
the model, defined by R ~ * = o  with all hard currency of the enterprise held as retained earnings, 
the first-order conditions are given by: 
Differentiating the first order conditions yields the matrices for comparative statics when the 
currency is not convertible, and B ~ C  (see the Appendix). Table 5 summarizes the resulting 
production responses to policy changes. In contrast to the results provided in Section 1V.I for 
policy effectiveness under currency convertibility, when no funds are supplied to auction or 
interbank markets, the role of market power in currency markets as determining the direction of 
production effects  disappear^.^^ Furthermore, when the currency is not convertible changes in 
the profit tax rate have real effects. The mechanism for this result is that the higher the tax rate, 
the higher the tax haven associated with retained earnings and the greater the relative 
attractiveness of exports. 
Specific examples of production responsiveness to policy changes are provided in 
equations (26) through (29). In the Soviet Union, where profit tax rates are generally around 
forty percent and the firms' unappropriated share of hard currency earnings is between ten and 
fifty percent, an official devaluation will reduce production for internal markets. In this case, an 
official devaluation will also increase export volumes.30 An increase in the firms' share of its 
hard currency earnings will also decrease production for home markets and increase export 
volumes. Both of these policy changes will increase overall production levels of the enterprise. 
290bviously, since R ~ * = o  at this margin, it is unnecessary to examine the effects of policy changes on currency 
supplies to auction and interbank markets. 
3%e opposite results could arise for extremely profitable firms which have high marginal tax rates. 
Table 5: Policy Effectiveness Without Currency Convertibility 
Production Response to Policy Changes 
For Internal Sales For Export Total Volume 
+ = increase; - = decrease. Total production=Y+Yh+Y, 
1: dY,/de < 0 if (1-T-w)>O ; dY,/de > 0 if (1-T-w)<O. 
2: dYx /ae < 0 requires (1-T-w)>O;sufficient condition E~*(~-T-~)-~(~-T)~,'[~*(~-T-~)+TE*']<o 
Otherwise, dYx /de > 0 . 
3: a~ /ae > o if (I-T-W)>O ; I~(I-T-w)<o, a~ /ae > o if p * ( ~ - ~ - ~ ) + ~ ~ * ' > ~ ;  
Otherwise dY /de < 0 . 
4: assumes the cross derivative (quantity then q) is small relative to p,q. 
5 dY,/dT < 0 if p'e-p,'~, - p, < 0; dY,IdT > 0 ifp*e-p, '~,  - p, > 0 . 
6 :  dYx/dT > 0 if p'e-p,'~,, - p, < 0 and pfe-(E1+eE*') < 0 (sufficient, not necessary); 
dYx/dT < 0 if p*e-p,'~, - p, > 0 and pie-(Et+eE*') > 0 (sufficient, not necessary). 
': dY /dT > 0 if p*e-(Et+eE*') < 0; dY /dT <O if p*e-(E'+eEt ') < 0. 
6Yh/6e = (det Aic)-l[- E p*(l-T-w) ] 
6Yx/6e = (det Aic)-I [- E [(1 -T)e(l -w) + w(e2+ $ -e) ] ] 
6Yh/6w = (det Alc)-l[- E p*(e2+ $ -e) ] 
aYx/6w= (det Aic)-I[(- E + 2ph1)(-p*)(e2+ $ -e) ] 
det A ~ C  = - E 2ph' where E = (1-T)E" + (e2+ $ -T~)E*" 
The competitiveness of the internal goods markets determines the magnitude of 
production responses to policy changes, as was concluded in the convertible-currency case. 
When the currency is not convertible, decreasing the monopolistic power of the enterprises leads 
to greater output effects of policy changes for both production for export and production for 
internal sales. Nonetheless, changes in pi do not effect the responsiveness to policy of total 
production levels. While p,t matters for the composition of the responses to policy changes, it 
does not matter for the impact on total production volumes or for total demands for domestic and 
imported inputs into production. 
IV.111 Policv Changes and the Balance of Pavments 
The effects of policy instruments on the trade accounts of the balance of payments 
depend on whether or not the domestic currency is convertible and on the design of the markets. 
Recall that our model and discussion has focussed only on the activities of net exporters. 
Consequently, the partial-equilibrium framework supports analysis of the sectoral trade balance, 
but not the trade balance for the aggregated economy.31 Define the sectoral trade balance (in 
hard currency) as:32 
p * ~ x - ~ * ( ~ )  
The effects of the policy changes on the trade balance are summarized in Table 6 for both the 
convertible currency and the inconvertible-currency cases. The effects are disaggregated by 
changes in exports, imports, and the total sectoral balance. An additional effect due to export 
valuation occurs when p* changes. 
If e i  is small, improvements in the trade balance are associated with increases in the 
world price of exports, official devaluations, increased official hard-currency retention rates 
(reductions in foreign-exchange surrender requirements), and increases in the turnover tax on 
internal sales of the export goods. If e2' is large, stronger conditions are required to determine 
31This is a partial equilibrium model and does not consider spillover effects on other markets or across enterprises. 
32This definition of the sectoral trade balance includes both the hard currency received by the enterprise and the hard 
currency surrendered to the central government. 
whether policy changes will improve or worsen the trade balance. Indeed, in this case i t  is 
possible that the trade balance will be worsened by increased world-market prices for exports 
and by reduced government foreign-exchange surrender requirements, and the expansionary 
effects of official exchange-rate devaluations are diminished. The power of exports to influence 
the domestic currency terms-of-trade on their transactions in internal and external markets 
weakens and potential reverses the strength of conventionally accepted policy effects. 
In conclusion, the effects of policy changes on the balance-of-payments are highly 
sensitive to the extent of economic reforms undertaken in goods markets and currency markets. 
Without competitive markets for the exchange of hard currency earnings, the beneficial effects 
of official devaluations on the trade balance are reduced if not altogether reversed. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The stage of reforms undertaken in currency markets and goods markets determine the 
effectiveness of policy-instruments in a transition economy. In this paper we have shown that 
the decisions of exporters depend on the amount of monopoly power that they can exert in two 
distinct markets: (1) the internal goods market in which output is sold and (2) the internal 
market in which the enterprises sell hard currency earnings. 
If the domestic currency becomes convertible, the direction of an enterprises' output 
response to shocks is determined by its ability to influence the effective-exchange-rate received 
on exports. This monopoly-power in currency markets can reverse the conventional wisdom 
about the expect impact of policy measures. This implies that the introduction of some exchange 
rate flexibility, achieved through the establishment of auction or interbank markets, is not a 
sufficient condition for movement toward a normal and competitive market structure. If these 
currency markets are not sufficiently competitive, exporter responses to standard policy 
prescriptions could undermine the intended outcome of the policies. 
It was also shown that the magnitude of production response to policy changes depends 
on the enterprises' ability to exert monopoly-power and influence the price it receives on this 
Table 6: Policy Changes and the Sectoral Trade Balance 
I. With Currencv Convertibilitv (cases: small e2' / large e2) 
Exvorts Imports Trade Balance 
P* increase1 decrease increase improves1 worsens 
e increase increaseldecrease improves 
w increaseldecrease increase improves1 worsens 
Y no effect no effect no effect 
9 increase decreaselincrease improves 
11. Without Currencv Convertibilitv 
Exvorts Imports Trade Balance 
P * increase increase improves 
e increase decrease improves 
w decrease increase W O ~ S ~ I ~ S  
Y no effect no effect no effect 
9 increase decrease improves 
T increaseldecrease increaseldecrease ambiguous 
Assumes (1-T-w)>O and @* - E*)>o. 
Endnotes of Table 4 provide sufficient conditions on output responses for the convertible currency case. 
good. The higher the firm's ability to inflence the price of the good in internal markets, the 
greater its ability to offset the effects of policy changes by shifting the internal terms-of-trade in 
production. The higher the monopolistic pricing-behavior in internal goods markets in a 
transition economy, the higher the probability that policy changes will be the manifested in 
domestic goods prices rather than in supplies of goods to domestic markets. This is true 
regardless of whether currency convertibility has been achieved. 
A puzzle to policy-makers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been the 
reluctance of enterprises to participate, on the supply-side in auctions of hard currency. The 
willingness of enterprises to supply currency is clearly associated with the structure of after-tax 
returns from selling hard currency internally versus holding foreign currency in the form of 
retained earnings. Even if such convertibility is achieved, stabilization programs targeted at 
production and the balance-of-payments should proceed cautiously until both internal goods 
markets and internal currency markets reach sufficient stages of competitiveness. 
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Comparative Statics Matrices for Currencv Convertibilitv Case: 
Matrix ACC: 
a,, = e,E*l1 + E' + e,'[ E"'(~*WY,-E*) - 2(p*w - E * ' ) ~  + 2p*w(p*w-2~*')] -2ph1 
*I1 * 
a,, = a,, = e2E*" + E' + e,'[ E (p WY,-E*) - 2(p*w - E * ' ) ~  + 2p*w(p*w-~*')] 
a,, = e,E*l1 + E' + e2'[ E*~~(~*WY,-E*) - 2(p*w - E*')2] 
The determinant of ACC is given by: 
Det ACC = a,, [ - Y ~ ~ ~ ~ - z ~ ~ ~ -  2e21(p*w)2] - [ Z ~ , ' ~ * W ( ~ * W - E * ~ ) ] ~  
Matrix BCC (in transpose form): 
6e 
- 
0 p*(l-w) 
w -2e;Y,w E*' [e(l-w)+e,w ] + ~~W[(~*WY,-E*)+~Y,(~*W-E*~)] 
6w - -2e,'YB*E*' p*(e, - e)+p*e, ' [ (p*w~x-~*)+2~x(p*w-~*1)]  
- ~ ~ [ E * ~ ' ( ~ * W Y , - E * ) - ~ ( E * ~ ) ~ ]  - (e,E*'+ El') -e,'[E*"(p*w~,-E*)+z(E*~)(~*w-E*')]- (e,E*''+ 
a¶ Ph'qyh + Phq 0 
Com~arative Statics Matrices under Currency Inconvertibilitv: 
Matric A ~ C :  ( Y ,  YJ 
a,, = -a + 2p,' 
a,, = = -E 
a,, = -E 
where e = (I-T)E" + (e2+4 -T~)E*" 
The determinant of Aic is given by: 
Det Aic = -&2ph1 > 0 
Matrix B ~ C  (in transpose form): 
6e 
- -TE*' -(I-T)P*(I-w) + T(P*W-E*') 
w 0 -(l-T)e(l-w) - w(e2+4 -Te) 
6w 
-
0 -p*(e2+4 -Te) 
6Y 
- 
E E 
a¶ -(l-')(phfqyh + phq) O 
6T - (phtYh + ph) - [E1+eE*I] p*e - [Et+eE*'] 
Further Comparative Statics Results 
The interior solution to the comparative statics problem has a non-margin solution for R2*. This 
solution is a saddlepoint and an unstable equilibrium. Nonetheless, the comparative statics 
results are available on request. Below, we present the matrices which could be used for 
generating the results for the solution to the system given by : 
= i ~ 1 - l  [B] [uf 
The corresponding Matrix 8, is : 
E*'e,' - p*we2' 2Te2' - e2"s 
E E *'e,' 
E 
and the Matrix B corresponding to (T,e, p* I w,Y,*q) and partitioned as [B, I B2] is: 
Matrix B, 
* T Yxwe2' 
TE*' o 
(I-w-T)p* + TE*' w(e,++e) + (I-T)e 1 
Matrix B, 
-E*'e,' 1 0 
-E E*' ( 1 -T)(P,'q Yh + Phq) 
- E -(wp*-E*') 0 1 
* 
where E = (1-T)E"+(~,++-T~)E*", and s= p*yXw-E - TR,* > 0. For the case of interior 
solutions for all variables, the determinant of A equals 
(l-T)(pfw - E*')(~,')~(P,"Y, + P,') 
+ E [e2"(1-T)(2p,'+ph"Yb) s - e,'( e,'E*'p*w + 2T(1-T)(phl + ph1'Y3)]. 
. DetA < 0 is guaranteed by E>O as in a diminishing returns production structure. 
